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Abstract
Historical rates of return on investments have received increasing scholarly atten-
tion in recent years. Much literature has focused especially on colonies, where insti-
tutions have been argued to facilitate severe exploitation. In the present study, we 
examine the return on investments in an Asian colony, British Malaya, from 1889 to 
1969 for a large sample of companies. Our results suggest that the return on invest-
ments in Malaya might have been among the highest in the world during the period 
studied. Nevertheless, this finding fits badly with theories of imperial exploitation 
and can only to a limited extent be explained by a higher risk premium. Instead, 
we argue that the main driver of the very high return on investments in Malaya was 
rather the substantial rise in global market prices of the output of the two main sec-
tors of the Malayan economy, rubber and tin. The way that the process of decoloni-
zation unfolded in Malaya did, furthermore, not lead to any major nationalization 
of foreign-held assets, and did thereby not disrupt the return on investment in the 
region in the same way as decolonization did to the return on investment in some 
other colonies.
Keywords Return on investments · Colonialism · Imperialism · Malaya · Asia · 
Twentieth century
JEL Classification F21 · F54 · G15 · N25
1 Introduction
Colonies have long been argued to have enabled investors to make particularly high 
profits, also known as ‘super-profits’, by allowing unusually severe exploitation. 
Recent research in the field of economic history has revived this concept. New evi-
dence suggests that colonial investments paid a premium on the return thanks to 
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colonial institutions favourable to the European investors. Yet, the previous literature 
in the field has focused for the most part on African colonies. One rare exception is a 
recent study of the Netherland’s Indies (current-day Indonesia) for a small sample of 
companies over a couple of decades in the mid-twentieth century.
In the present paper, we contribute to the debate on colonialism and return on 
investment with a study of another tropical Asian colony, British Malaya. Our study 
spans over a long period, from 1889 to 1969, and relies on a comparatively large 
sample of companies. The sample is dominated by investments in two key sectors 
of the colonial economy of British Malaya: tin and rubber. Our results show that 
the return on investment in Malaya was substantially higher than the return in any 
other part of the world for which data are available during the period under inves-
tigation. These results, we conclude, cannot be explained by exploitative labour 
regimes alone. In fact, the return on investments were at its highest at the end of 
the period under study, when the labour regime was much less repressive than it 
had been during the early colonial period. Partly, the high return can be explained 
by the fact that it was also a high-risk environment for investors. The volatility of 
return in British Malaya was rather high compared to regions with more diversified 
and mature investments objects. The most important factor behind these results, we 
argue, is, however, that the world market price of tin and rubber had a substantial 
impact upon the profitability of the ventures. The high (but volatile) prices can, in 
turn, be explained by rising demand from industrializing economies, and particu-
larly for military purposes. Finally, as the process of decolonization in Malaya led to 
no nationalizations of foreign businesses during the period under study, decoloniza-
tion did not reduce the average return on investment in the colony at the very end of 
the colonial period, as it did in some other colonies.
2  Research problem
At the end of the nineteenth century, capital exports from Europe increased dras-
tically. Many theories have been formulated to explain why such large amounts 
of capital were exported, and the patterns of where to it was exported. One of the 
key theories, suggested, for example, by the radical theorist John Hobson and later 
picked up by several Marxist thinkers, asserted that colonies were a crucial recipient 
of European capital investments during the age of high imperialism. Some would 
furthermore argue that colonies were merely a vent for surplus capital in Europe, 
countering any tendencies towards falling marginal return on investment on the 
domestic market. Others would put forth the stronger argument that the rate of 
return on investment was systematically higher in colonies than it was elsewhere 
due to economic exploitation of the colonies, and in particular of the local labour 
force (see Rönnbäck and Broberg 2019, chap. 3 for an overview of the discussion). 
The discussion has been re-invigorated in recent years by new research making just 
this particular claim, arguing, for example, that the high return on investment in the 
Netherlands Indies is attributable to “systematic labour repression” in the colony 
(Buelens and Frankema 2015; see also Buelens and Marysse 2009).
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In recent years, numerous studies have delved into the historical rates of return 
on investment in various parts of the world. In 2002, Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh and 
Mike Staunton published the book Triumph of the Optimists (Dimson et al. 2002), 
where they examined the return on investments in a number of developed countries 
around the world throughout the twentieth century. They showed substantial differ-
ences in the rate of return between countries, as well as over time. They also show 
why the standard deviation of returns—i.e. volatility—is an important measurement 
of risk when comparing different countries or regions over time (Dimson et al. 2002, 
54). Other studies have focused on the return on investment in developing countries. 
This is especially the case for Africa, where research has investigated the return on 
investment especially during the colonial era. Frans Buelens and Stefaan Marysse 
have studied the return on investments in Belgian Congo under colonial rule, from 
1889 to 1960, and argued that the return on investments were indeed higher there 
than in Belgium during the same period (Buelens and Marysse 2009). Klas Rönn-
bäck and Oskar Broberg have analysed the return on British investments in some 700 
companies operating in colonial Africa from 1869 to 1969. In contrast to Buelens 
and Marysse, they find that return on investment was only slightly higher in colonial 
Africa than in other parts of the world over the whole period under study, although 
the return on investment varied considerably over the time, with higher return on 
investing in colonies during specific periods (Rönnbäck and Broberg 2018, 2019).
Despite the recent surge of interest in the study of return of investment across the 
globe, there is only one previous study focusing on an Asian colony—Frans Buelens 
and Ewout Frankema’s study of the return on investments in 17 companies operating 
plantations in the Netherlands Indies during the period 1919–1958. They find that 
the rate of return on investment was substantially higher than the return on domestic 
investments in the Netherlands during the interwar period. Their interpretation of 
this finding is as support of the theory of colonial labour exploitation leading to 
higher return on investment (Buelens and Frankema 2015).
Neighbouring on the Netherlands Indies was British Malaya. Numerous schol-
ars have suggested that the investments in this colony generally were highly suc-
cessful and that investors could make high profits from investing there (Bach 1976, 
467; Thoburn 1977, Tables 5.9, 6.13, 6.18, 6.20; Khor 1983, 17–18, 57–58, 154–55; 
van Helten and Jones 1989, 159, 167; Lindblad 1997, 68; 1998, 47, 86–87; Drabble 
2000, 60, 116; Lees 2017, 171). However, these claims are made on highly anecdotal 
evidence—e.g. dividend data for one or a few selected companies during particular 
years. In their recent research, Dimson, Marsh and Staunton also include data on the 
historical rates of return on investments in Malaysia, but only from 1964 onwards 
(Dimson et al. 2019, 11). So far, no systematic attempt to study the return on invest-
ment in British Malaya has been undertaken over the longer run (most importantly 
including the colonial period of Malayan history) and for a large sample of com-
panies. Our study, therefore, attempts to contribute to filling this research gap. The 
research questions that we aim to answer are: how high was the return on investment 
in British Malaya, and how did it change over time? We conclude by discussing how 
our results can be interpreted in relation to the theoretical debates on the return on 
investment in colonies.
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3  Historical context
Prior to our period of investigation, Malaya had already been a key node in the 
Indian Ocean trade for several centuries. Despite being a comparatively small 
colony from the perspective of the imperial power Britain, it was, nonetheless 
the fifth most populous of Britain’s tropical colonies by the mid twentieth century 
(Havinden and Meredith 1996, table 1.2).
The colonization of Malaya by the British had been gradual, spanning over 
the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. First steps towards the 
colonization of the region had been taken already in the early nineteenth century 
by the British East India Company. The areas controlled by the Company formed 
the Straits Settlement, which was administered as a Crown Colony from 1867 to 
1942. Other parts of the Malayan peninsula were also colonized over time and 
became known as the Federated Malay States, administered by the British Crown, 
while the remainder of the peninsula constituted the Unfederated Malay States. 
North Borneo, on the other hand, was colonized and administered by the North 
Borneo Chartered Company until the 1940s. From the merger of these diverse 
territories, the Federation of Malaya was born in 1948. In 1957, the federation 
achieved political independence from Britain, and six years later formed the 
Federation of Malaysia (Allen and Donnithorne 1957, 40–41; Tregonning 1958, 
26–27; van Helten and Jones 1989, 159; Havinden and Meredith 1996, 39–40; 
Drabble 2000, 28–32; Tajuddin 2012, 30–42; Lees 2017, 4–7).
Although economic factors may not have been the prime motive behind the col-
onization of Malaya, “the British, by a typically unplanned act of serendipity, had 
stumbled upon a treasure chest, as Malaya became financially and commercially 
important in the twentieth century”, as Nicholas White put it (White 1999, 176). 
As was the case in so many other colonies, Malaya developed into an exporter 
of raw materials. In North Borneo it was the export of timber and tobacco, and 
eventually also of rubber (Tregonning 1958, 82–91; John and Jackson 1973). On 
the Malayan peninsula it was mostly tin and rubber (van Helten and Jones 1989, 
161). During the nineteenth century the Malayan economy, including rubber and 
tin production, was dominated by Chinese entrepreneurs (Parmer 1960, 7; Wong 
1965, 19–20; Yip 1969, chap. 2). By the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury, however, European capital—and in particular British—started to pour into 
the region. During the early decades of the twentieth century, Malaya had become 
one of the top global recipients of British investments in the raw materials-sector 
(Stone 1999, table 42). Virtually all of these investments were targeted at either 
the tin or the rubber sector, to the extent that in 1930 93 per cent of all British 
investments in Malaya were in either of these two sectors (van Helten and Jones 
1989, 163). The inflow of foreign investments were enabled by the comparatively 
liberal investment regime that the colonial authorities operated in Malaya (Lind-
blad 1997, 65; 1998, 84; Twomey 2000, 138–39). The Malayan economy thereby 
became the fastest growing economy in all of South-East Asia, with GDP more 
than doubling between 1870 and 1929 (Booth 2008, Table 1). Despite the rapid 
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growth, industrialization was negligible and the colony remained an exporter of 
raw materials dependent upon the importation of capital goods (Huff 2002).
By the late nineteenth century, Malayan tin mining experienced a consider-
able investment boom with several new flotations on the London Stock Exchange 
(Wong 1965, 124–25), although several of these early ventures failed. At this 
time, Chinese entrepreneurs could mine large surface deposits more competi-
tively than Europeans could by using labour-intensive mining techniques. Euro-
peans not only did not have major technological advantage yet, but often lacked 
access to enough capital to mine tin competitively (Wong 1965, 137–40; Lim 
1969, 50; Hennart 1986, 133–34; van Helten and Jones 1989, 165; Drabble 2000, 
56). During the early twentieth century, Chinese tin mining companies began 
experiencing problems when trying to recruit coolie labourers from China. Con-
currently, most of the surface deposits had been depleted, and more capital-inten-
sive forms of mining became necessary to survive in the competition. Dredging 
and gravel pumping became the two most common methods of mining tin in the 
region during the period (Thoburn 1977, table  5.2). European companies were 
better able to introduce such labour-saving, capital-intensive, technologies thanks 
to their greater access to the London financial market, a factor that can explain 
why European entrepreneurs were able to gradually increase their market shares 
(Wong 1965, 203–30; Lim 1969, 50; Yip 1969, chap. 3; Hennart 1986, 135–37; 
van Helten and Jones 1989, 165; Drabble 2000, 56). The development of capital-
intensive mining would, however, probably not have occurred without the addi-
tional factor of high real prices for the tin output (Matthews 1990).
Rubber plantations were the second major sector to develop in colonial Malaya. 
Similar to tin mining, the sector had been dominated by Chinese entrepreneurs in 
the nineteenth century. Some attempts by Europeans to establish rubber planta-
tions were first undertaken in the 1890s (Drabble 1973, 20–21). In some cases, early 
Chinese and British enterprises developed in symbiosis (Tuan 2010). A major rub-
ber boom, due to a drastic increase in the demand for rubber to feed the growing 
automobile industry among others, started around 1905. This led to a wave of new 
company flotations to establish plantations in Malaya (Allen and Donnithorne 1957, 
111–12; Lim 1969, 75; Stillson 1971; Drabble 1972; 1973, 30–34). Plantations that 
previously had been devoted to other crops, such as sugar, were hastily converted 
into rubber (Lees 2007). Malaya quickly became one of the world’s leading plan-
tation economies in terms of acreage (Christopher 1985, table IV). The following 
years would then be highly volatile for the rapidly growing sector. A new, and even 
more drastic, boom came in 1909–1910, yet by the First World War, the rubber sec-
tor had experienced a first major slump. During the war, attempts were made to 
impose voluntary restrictions on rubber exports in order to counter the depressed 
prices (Drabble 1973, 106–7, 138). Further slumps occurred in 1920–22, largely as 
a consequence of falling world demand for rubber, which impacted hard upon the 
Malayan economy (Parmer 1960, 8–10; Drabble 1972, 258; 1973, 169; van Hel-
ten and Jones 1989, 171–74; Drabble 2000, 122–24). In response, a scheme was 
imposed between 1922 and 1928 with the aim to increase and stabilize rubber prices 
by restricting the output of rubber in Malaya, the so-called Stevenson Restriction 
Scheme (Allen and Donnithorne 1957, 121; Lim 1969, 76). At the same time, the 
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industry grew increasingly concentrated, with a few companies owning a growing 
number of plantations in the colony (Lindblad 1998, 85).
Several factors contributed to the large foreign investments in the Malayan econ-
omy during this early part of the colonial period. Pax Britannica, the stability and 
security that the British Empire provided, undoubtedly made many investors more 
willing to invest in the colony (Drabble 1974, 201; Hennart 1986, 132; Harvey and 
Press 1990, 112; Lindblad 1997, 63). Investments in infrastructure created further 
incentives for investments by lowering trade costs. It was during the nineteenth cen-
tury that Singapore developed as a major trade entrepôt, a factor that contributed to 
the development of trade on the rest of the Malayan peninsula (Jones et  al. 1993, 
64, 139). The construction of a railroad network on the Malayan peninsula began 
in 1885, and by 1899 the railway connected all key mining areas in the peninsula 
with the ports. In order to take advantage of the new transport infrastructure, rub-
ber plantations often came to be established along the newly developed railway net-
work (Yip 1969, 115–16; Latham 1978, 19; Drabble 2000, 82–88). The connection 
of both Penang and Singapore to the global telegraph network in 1870 furthermore 
made communication between company boards in Europe, and the companies’ local 
representatives easier and faster (Latham 1978, 34; Lees 2017, 31).
The institutional setting provided substantial support particularly to European 
planters, in the form of land alienation policies. In the 1890s, the colonial regime 
had taken over the control of all matters related to land alienation in Malaya (Tajud-
din 2012, 38; Lees 2017, 40–41). This was at a time when land in Malaya turned 
from being an abundant resource to being scarce (Jomo 1986, 86). As land became 
scarce, competition for all unalienated land grew increasingly fierce. From the early 
twentieth century onwards, the colonial government in Malaya systematically prior-
itized Europeans applying for land before all other applicants, in particular before 
Malayan smallholders. As a result, much of the best and more fertile land came to 
be appropriated by European planters (Jomo 1986, 199; Drabble 1973, 74; 2000, 64; 
Lees 2017, 176).1
The colonial government further supported European investors by increasing the 
supply of labour at a low cost. The remarkable growth rates experienced in rubber 
planting and tin mining in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to 
a rapidly growing demand for labourers (Rasiah 1995, 55). Malayan workers were 
considered to be too expensive by European entrepreneurs, so attempts were made 
to recruit cheaper indentured servants from India, China and Java, with the colo-
nial government acting as an intermediary in the importation of the “coolie” labour-
ers (Parmer 1960; Chai 1964, chap. 3; Tajuddin 2012, 56–61; Lees 2017, 42–47; 
van Helten and Jones 1989, 171–74; Ramasamy 1992). Other labour policies were 
aimed at further favouring the interest of the employers, for example, by controlling 
the movement of labourers so that they could not seek employment for anybody else 
than the one who had recruited them in the first place. Labourers who did not com-
ply with their contract could be sent to jail (Wong 1965, 116; Lees 2017, 89–93). 
1 Further restrictions were later imposed, for example, in order to keep Japanese investors out of the 
competition for land (Leng 1974).
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Furthermore, numerous leading planters formed a cartel on the labour market aimed 
at reducing, or at least limiting, the wages paid to workers with the tacit acceptance 
of the colonial government (Parmer 1960, 173).
The Great Depression hit Malayan export economy hard once again, particularly 
the rubber plantations as rubber prices plummeted to very low levels. Concurrently, 
tin prices took a downfall due to excess production that impacted on the profitability 
of mining companies (Lim 1969, 78–79; Lindblad 1998, 15; Drabble 2000, 130). 
Malayan producers reverted to the establishment of international cartels aimed at 
increasing prices by limiting output. In the 1930s the International Tin Cartel and 
the Rubber Regulation Agreement were founded. Despite their aim being to raise 
the profitability of these industries, both had only very limited success (Hillman 
1988, 1997; Drabble 2000, 130–31; Hillman 2010; Allen and Donnithorne 1957, 
125; Parmer 1960, 10; Lim 1969, 80).
During the Second World War, from the late 1941 to 1945, the Malayan peninsula 
was occupied by the Japanese. Before abandoning the colony to the Japanese forces, 
the British practiced a “scorched earth” policy, destroying capital that had been 
invested, particularly in the tin mines. Rubber planters would also suffer from the 
occupation, as the Japanese demand for rubber was far lower than the output from 
the Malayan plantations (Bauer 1948, 341; Lim 1969, 61; Yip 1969, 287; Drabble 
2000, 149–52). In the post-war years, recovery was comparatively quick for the rub-
ber plantations thanks to the limited degree of capital destruction in the plantation 
sector, while it took longer for tin mining since capital destruction in this sector had 
been more extensive (Drabble 2000, 156). In the years following the war, Malayan 
producers did also receive some war compensation for capital destroyed during the 
war (Yip 1969, 307). Although the rubber sector was able to recover quickly, in the 
post-war economy it faced mounting competition from synthetic rubber, which had 
been developed during the war (Lim 1969, 84–85). Tin was, in contrast, in short 
supply after the war. In order to boost prices, the colonial government imposed a 
guaranteed price. The price was set so high that numerous investors anticipated sub-
stantial future profits, which boosted the stock prices of several tin mining compa-
nies (White 2015, 171).
In 1948, an armed insurgency arose in Malaya. The insurgents were mainly 
active in remote, rural areas of the colony. The tin-mines were particularly vulner-
able against attacks due to their geographical location. Not only did the insurgency 
affect already established tin mines, but it made it hard, if not impossible, to develop 
new mines in the affected regions (Drabble 2000, 153; White 2015, 172, 186–88). 
The “Emergency”, as the colonial authorities dubbed the insurrection, was met with 
fierce repression from the colonial government, and by the mid-1950s it became 
clear that the colonial government was winning the battle (White 2004, 97; Tajuddin 
2012, 134–38).
Despite the insurrection, the colonial government continued to support European 
entrepreneurs through its labour policies, even in the late colonial era. Although 
slightly more liberal than it had been earlier on, so that actions that were criminal-
ized in the late nineteenth century by this time had come to be accepted, labour poli-
cies in the main continued to favour the employers’ interests (Lees 2017, 192). Trade 
unions were not recognized by the colonial authorities in Malaya until the 1940s, 
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and even once recognized in principle, the colonial authorities actively tried to limit 
the degree of unionization, for example, through the establishment of government-
controlled yellow unions (Lim 1969, 120; Jomo 1986, 235–36). In addition, attempts 
to organize collectively were often forcibly repressed by the government still in the 
1940s (Ramasamy 1992).
From the 1950s onwards, the Malayan economy experienced a series of three ‘big 
pushes’ (Lim 1969, 8–18). The first ‘push’ followed the outbreak of the Korean War 
in 1950, when prices for several commodities, including tin and rubber, increased. 
Tin prices, in particular, skyrocketed as tin was considered a strategic commodity 
for the war effort (Drabble 2000, 160–61; White 2015, 174). In the aftermath of the 
Korean War, the International Tin Agreement was successfully established, entering 
into force in 1956. This event—together with the continuation of the United States 
strategic stockpiling of tin—contributed to a second ‘push’ (Smith and Schink 1976; 
Gilbert 1977; 1996; Drabble 2000, 230; White 2015, 185). The gains from this 
‘push’ were short-lived, and the tin mining sector experienced an economic crisis 
in the following years. As a result, several Malayan mines were closed in an attempt 
towards rationalization (White 2015, 185–89). A third push came some years late, 
and positively impacted on the prices of both tin and rubber, among other commodi-
ties (Lim 1969, 8–18).
At this stage, however, the process of decolonization was well underway in 
Malaya. In 1946, the chartered rule of North Borneo finally ended (Tregonning 
1958, 222). By 1957, the entire Malaya had achieved political independence from 
Britain. The government of the newly independent country chose not to challenge 
any of the foreign-owned companies until the 1970s, leaving British companies in 
control of much of the Malayan economy long after independence (Lindblad 1998, 
106–8; White 1994, 251; 2004, 2). All in all, in the post-war economy rubber and tin 
emerged as the two leading dollar-earners for the British empire, especially with the 
rise of the exportation of these commodities to the United States (White 2015, 171; 
Sutton 2016).
4  Methods and data
To study the financial performance of individual companies is often problematic, as 
publicly reported figures on company profits might be misleading for several rea-
sons. For example, the company might have an interest in showing smaller profits for 
tax-reasons, the board might prioritize re-investment and growth before profits and 
the leading owner’s might have reasons to minimize profits in order to strengthen 
their own position vis a vis the financial market.
In recent years, several studies in the field of financial history have therefore 
opted for studying the return on investment—i.e. to analyse financial performance 
from the perspective of the investors in the companies rather than from company 
declared profits (Edelstein 1970, 1976, 1982; Dimson et al. 2002; Buelens and Mar-
ysse 2009; Buelens and Frankema 2015; Grossman 2015; Rönnbäck and Broberg 
2019). By studying the return on investment, we implicitly assume that contem-
porary agents on the financial market were reasonably well informed about the 
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company’s activities over the long run, and therefore in a position to judge the value 
of the company. This would thus translate into changes in the market price of the 
company’s shares. Such changes constitute, however, only one part of the total return 
on investing in the company. Another part is dividends to shareholders. Hence, if 
investors were reasonably well informed about the company’s activities, the total 
return on investment ought to be a reasonable proxy for a company’s performance, 
at least over the long run.
The present study examines the return on investments in British Malaya chan-
nelled via the London Stock Exchange from 1889 to 1969. The territory we analyse 
includes the Straits Settlement, the Federated and Unfederated Malay States, and 
North Borneo. For the sake of simplicity, we will henceforth call this whole region 
‘Malaya’, as a shorthand for the territories that composed the Federation of Malaya, 
later re-named Malaysia.
During the nineteenth century, London was the leading financial centre of the 
world, and most capital exports went through the London Stock Exchange. It was 
only by the early twentieth century that other financial centres, most importantly 
New York, challenged London’s primacy in the financial sector. Still, London 
remained one of the most important financial centres of the world throughout the 
period under examination in this article (Michie 2006; Cassis 2010). Furthermore, 
most of the capital invested in Malaya during the period under study originated in 
Britain (Latham 1978, 55–56; van Helten and Jones 1989, 163–64; Rasiah 1995, 50; 
Lindblad 1997, 64; Drabble 2000, 54; Twomey 2000, 139), while only a minor share 
came from other parts of the world, including, for example, Australia, USA, China 
and Japan (Leng 1974; Birch 1976; Lindblad 1998, 22;64; Hillman 2005; Yacob 
2009; Latham 1978, 55–56; Jelenkovic et al. 2016, 163–64; Rasiah 1995, 50; Drab-
ble 2000, 54; Twomey 2000, 139). Previous research has shown that the degree of 
international integration of financial markets for ventures that were operating inter-
nationally was high already in the nineteenth century (Campbell and Rogers 2017). 
If the capital invested in Malaya coming from other places than London targeted 
other (types of) ventures than that channelled via London, it could potentially have 
experienced a different return on investment than the one estimated in the present 
study. Whether that was the case may be topic for future research. Nevertheless, it 
seems plausible to assume that the return on investment that London investors faced 
when investing in Malaya would be a reasonable proxy for a weighted average of all 
investments in the colony.
In order to study the total return on investment, data on the price of the equity 
of companies operating in Malaya and data on dividends paid out to the share-
holders in the same companies are required. Our measurement of risk—volatil-
ity—follows practice in financial history and it is derived from these data as the 
standard deviation of the annual return (Dimson et al. 2002, 54–55). Data on the 
price of shares can be found in publications such as the Investors’ Monthly Man-
ual (IMM), a publication aimed at informing investors about what was happening 
on the London Stock Exchange since 1864, and The Times of London. Data from 
these sources have been digitized by the company Global Financial Data (GFD). 
For the purpose of this article, data on all companies registered as operating in 
Malaya or Singapore were acquired from GFD. In terms of reliability, previous 
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research shows that GFD’s data are highly reliable when it comes to share prices. 
The frequency of the data is either daily or monthly (varying between compa-
nies and sometimes over time); we have here consistently used monthly data 
(i.e. for series where there are daily data, we have used data from the last trad-
ing day of each month). GFD’s database also contains data on other variables, 
but these show lower level of reliability, for example, due to missing data (see 
Rönnbäck and Broberg 2019, chap. 5). For the purpose of this article, data on 
these additional variables have therefore been assembled directly from a primary 
source, namely the London Stock Exchange Yearbooks, published annually since 
1890 and providing key information on all the companies listed on the exchange, 
including data on the number of shares outstanding, gross dividends paid out to 
the shareholders, and any capital operations (such as splits).
Table 1 summarizes the number of companies in the sample and the number 
of observations (company-months) per sectoral portfolio as well as for the whole 
sample under study.
The category of “other” companies operates in various sectors, including real 
estate, commercial services, consumer products and plantations (other than rub-
ber). The most important of these, in terms of market capitalization, were operat-
ing plantations (other than rubber) on Borneo. Both common and preferred stocks 
have been included in the sample. Preferred stock only make up a small fraction 
(seven data-series) of the sample, and at most constitute a few percentage points 
in terms of share of total market capitalization. The sample size varies over time, 
peaking in 1916 at 148 companies (see Appendix Fig. 5). An increase in the num-
ber of ventures meant that the concentration of the portfolio decreased over time. 
At the outset of the study, three companies—with the British North Borneo Com-
pany being the leading one—accounted for the whole sample in terms of mar-
ket capitalization. By 1916, the three largest companies only accounted for ten 
per cent of the total market capitalization of the whole portfolio (see Appendix 
Fig. 6). In 1929–1930, there is a break in the series when the number of compa-
nies in the sample suddenly drops. This is largely attributable to a shift in the pri-
mary sources employed by Global Financial Data when constructing their data-
base. Nonetheless, all major companies in terms of market capitalization remain 
in the sample, so the change is deemed to have comparatively limited effect upon 
market capitalization- weighted estimate of the total return on investment. Nomi-
nal return on investment have, finally, been calculated using data on historical 
inflation based on a consumer price index (O’Donoghue et al. 2004).
Table 1  Summary of sample of 
Malayan companies
Source Own estimate based on dataset from Global Financial Data
Sector Companies Company-months
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Malaysian stocks continued to be traded on the London Stock Exchange through-
out the Japanese occupation of Malaya, from the end of 1941 to 1945. As the British 
boards and investors during this time would have had little influence over the com-
pany’s operations in occupied Malaya, trading would reflect anticipation of future 
earnings from the stocks.
4.1  Results
Figure 1 shows the market capitalization (in constant prices) of the 246 companies 
in our sample. During the nineteenth century, companies in ‘other’ sectors dominate 
the sample. This includes most notably the British North Borneo Company, char-
tered to colonize and administer North Borneo (Tregonning 1958; Griffiths 1974, 
chap. 16). There are, furthermore, a few tobacco and sugar estates as well as some 
other companies, several operating in North Borneo. After a long period of decline, 
companies operating in ‘other’ sectors saw their market capitalization increase at the 
end of the period under study, driven by a few companies involved in construction, 
real estate, and chemicals.
Our data confirm the boom-and-bust-pattern of the rubber sector put forth by pre-
vious scholars (see most importantly Drabble 1972; 1973). The pattern is clearly 
visible in Fig. 1, from the early booms in 1905–1910 to the slumps in in the interwar 































































Fig. 1  Market capitalization of Malayan ventures traded on the London Stock Exchange, 1889–1969 
(£ millions, constant prices). Source: Share prices data from Global Financial Data; data on number of 
shares outstanding assembled from the London Stock Exchange Yearbooks 1890–1970
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Compared to rubber, tin mining experienced considerably less variation and 
strong secular growth. By the end of the period, the market capitalization of the 


































































Mining Rubber Other All sectors
Fig. 2  Accumulated total return on investment in Malaya, by sector (index, 1888 = 100, logarithmic 
scale). Source: see Fig.  1. Data on dividends paid out assembled from London Stock Exchange Year-
books 1890–1970
Table 2  Average total real 
return on investments in 
Malaya, by sector and decade, 
1889–1969 (per cent per year, 
geometric mean, with yearly 
standard deviation over the 
whole period in parenthesis)
Source: see Fig. 2. Annual figures are reported in Table 4 in appen-
dix to the paper.
*Rubber companies only start to appear in our sample in 1906, so 
the period in this particular cell of the table only spans from 1906 
to 1909.
Period Tin mining Rubber Other sectors All sectors
1889–1899  − 28.7 – − 11.3 − 13.9
1900–1909 − 20.4 +47.5* +11.3 +15.0
1910–1919 +8.8 − 0.5 − 0.7 − 0.3
1920–1929 +21.5 − 2.8 − 0.5 +0.2
1930–1939 +22.4 +3.5 +23.5 +10.4
1940–1949 +5.1 − 6.6 +9.7 − 0.5
1950–1959 +55.1 +36.2 − 11.8 +46.1
1960–1969 +28.2 +6.8 +11.6 +18.0
Whole period 9.7 (42.7) 7.5 (43.0) 3.8 (39.8) 7.9 (35.7)
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Figure 2 shows an index of the total accumulated return on investment, by sector 
and for the whole sample of companies, over the period under examination. Aver-
ages by decade, again by sector and for the whole sample, are available in Table 2 
(yearly data are reported in Appendix Table 4).
The return on investment in Malaya was high on average over the whole period 
under study. This was particularly the case in the tin mining sector, but also in the 
rubber plantations-sector. In order to understand this high return, we must look at 
the major changes over time.
One factor that has been suggested in previous research as driving a high 
return on investment in colonies was the presence of exploitative colonial institu-
tions. In their article on the return on investment in the Netherlands Indies, Frans 
Buelens and Ewout Frankema interpret their findings of comparatively high return 
on investment as the effect of systematic labour repression in the colony (Buelens 
and Frankema 2015)2, yet they do not test this hypothesis directly. Klas Rönnbäck 
and Oskar Broberg, in their study of the return on investments in colonial Africa, 
discuss whether what they call exploitative labour institutions might have affected 
the return on investments in the British colonies. They find some evidence tenta-
tively supporting this interpretation in the form of a higher return on investments 
in settler colonies, generally described as being characterized by a higher degree of 
exploitative labour institutions, than in non-settler colonies (Rönnbäck and Broberg 
2019, Fig. 13.5). Several scholars have noted that repressive or exploitative meas-
ures against labourers were in place also in British Malaya. Indentured servitude, 
for example, was continually in use in the early phase of this study, with “coolies” 
being imported from China or India legally until 1910, when the practice was abol-
ished (Parmer 1960, 6–7; van Helten and Jones 1989, 171–74; Ramasamy 1992, 
89–90; Lindblad 1998, 43). Colonial authorities were also active in repressing trade 
unions, and attempts by the labourers to collectively organize were still opposed in 
the 1940s (Ramasamy 1992). Previous literature in the field, however, tends to sug-
gest that the measures grew less repressive over the period under examination, with 
unions, for example, starting to be officially recognized by the colonial authorities 
after the Second World War. If coercive labour institutions were the key explanatory 
factor driving the return on investments, the return then ought to have been at its 
highest during the early colonial period of Malayan history, when previous scholars 
agree that the colonial labour market institutions were the most repressive. This does 
not seem to have been the case. During the first decades for which data are avail-
able, the average investor in Malaya experienced quite substantial losses. Losses 
were the greatest in the mining sector. The claims made in the specialist literature on 
Malayan economic history that numerous of the early European tin mining ventures 
in Malaya failed economically thus find support in our analysis of the total return on 
investments (Fig. 2). British investments in the Malayan mining sector on average 
experienced astounding losses of 28.7 per cent per year in real terms in the 1890s, 
and 20.4 per cent per year in the 1900s (Table 2). At the outbreak of the First World 
2 They also add the caveat that the high return they estimate “may also partly reflect a higher risk-pre-
mium” without elaborating further on this topic.
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War, the total return on investments index had dropped from 100 to 0.5. Investors in 
several other companies, including the British North Borneo Company, also expe-
rienced losses during this early period, but not as drastic as in the case of the min-
ing sector (Table  2). As for investments in rubber plantations, these did certainly 
yield a very high return during the first years for which we have data (from 1906 
onwards). This very high return does, however, in the main not seem to be attributa-
ble to the exploitative colonial institutions in general, but rather to the great interna-
tional booms on the international rubber market in 1905–1906 and 1909–10, empha-
sized in much of the previous literature (Allen and Donnithorne 1957, 111–12; Lim 
1969, 75; Stillson 1971; Drabble 1972; 1973, 30–34, 106–7). As rubber companies 
only start to appear in our sample in 1906, our data miss out the direct effect of the 
rubber boom in 1905. The following rubber boom in 1909–10 is, however, clearly 
visible in our data: the rubber portfolio of investments experienced an average real 
rate of return of 105 per cent per year during these two years. This boom was then 
followed by a stagnation that lasted several years. Although the losses that many 
Malayan companies faced might have been even greater in the absence of repressive 
labour institutions that kept labour costs low during the early years of colonialism in 
Malaya, the high average rate of return on investments that we find over the period 
under study cannot be attributed to such institutions per se, we believe.
The interwar years exhibit several important changes. Firstly, the portfolio of min-
ing investments, which had hit its lowest point just before the outbreak of the war, 
gradually recovered. The sector’s performance was particularly strong in the first 
half of the 1920s and again in the second half of the 1930s, when the International 
Tin Cartel was in operation (Fig. 2). This finding supports the claim that European 
tin mining enterprises grew more competitive vis a vis Chinese entrepreneurs, who 
now lacked capital and labour to survive (Wong 1965, 203–30; Lim 1969, 50; Hen-
nart 1986, 135–37; van Helten and Jones 1989, 165; Drabble 2000, 56). With an 
average real return on investments of 21.5 per cent per year in the 1920s, and 22.4 
per cent per year in the 1930s, the mining portfolio had recovered from the losses 
experienced prior to the First World War. In contrast, investments in the rubber sec-
tor stagnated in terms of the return on investments. After the boom in 1909–10, the 
rubber sector fluctuated substantially. Our findings confirm that the performance of 
the rubber sector was very poor 1920–1921, and again during the Great Depression 
in the early 1930s (Fig.  2). Over the whole interwar period, investors in a rubber 
portfolio experienced a small loss (Table 2). Investments in other sectors than min-
ing and rubber experienced a healthier return during the interwar period, particu-
larly in the 1930s. However, by this time the market capitalization of these compa-
nies had been dwarfed by the vast amount of investments going into rubber and tin 
mining, as visible in Fig. 1.
As was noted above, Malayan stocks continued to be traded on the London Stock 
Exchange during the Japanese occupation of Malaya. The immediate occupation 
impacted British investors heavily. The “scorched earth” policy pursued by the Brit-
ish government, most certainly in combination with the uncertainty over whether 
the companies ever would be able to regain any Malayan assets, led to share prices 
dropping drastically for the vast majority of the Malayan ventures in our sample. 
As a consequence, investors faced major losses at the end of 1941 (with a return 
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on investment of − 44.5 per cent this year for the whole Malayan portfolio), with 
tin mining being the most negatively impacted. As the war progressed, however, 
share prices of Malayan stocks started to recover, possibly reflecting regained inves-
tor confidence, thus leading to positive return on investment, particularly from 1943 
onwards.
The post-war period brought about some further changes. Tin mining, on the one 
hand, continued its climb, experiencing a fabulous average return on investment, 
particularly in the 1950s with an estimated return on investment of 55.1 per cent 
per year. This extremely high average return on investment cannot be explained as 
risk premia. On the contrary, the tin mining companies were well established after 
1914 and the volatility of return came down to levels that were relatively “normal” 
among colonial investments (Buelens and Frankema 2015; Buelens and Marysse 
2009). One key factor to take into account was the process of decolonization of Brit-
ish Malaya. Previous research from Africa suggests that the process of decoloniza-
tion occasionally could have severe negative effects upon the return on investments 
in that colony. Buelens and Marysse, for instance, have argued that the decoloni-
zation of Belgian Congo caused major losses for investors, reducing the average 
rate of return in the colony substantially (Buelens and Marysse 2009). Rönnbäck 
and Broberg have also suggested that this happened at least in the case of Egypt, 
with the effect of total return on investing in the country being negative as share 
prices fell. Decolonization was, however, not always associated with losses for for-
eign investors. In several African colonies, such as Nigeria or Ghana, the process of 
decolonization did not lead to any nationalization of foreign-held assets. The British 
investors hence lost little or no capital as a consequence of decolonization of these 
colonies (Rönnbäck and Broberg 2019, 329–30). As noted above, the process of 
decolonization of British Malaya was far from peaceful. It is thus possible that the 
armed insurgency which arose in 1948 could be an important factor in explaining 
the great losses experienced by several companies this very year, although our data 
would seem to suggest that investors in rubber companies actually were the ones 
experiencing losses (see Appendix Table 4), in contrast to previous research which 
has argued that the insurgency primarily impacted tin mining. From the perspective 
of the investors, the armed insurgency was essentially crushed during “the Emer-
gency”, by the early 1950s, and the continued process of decolonization did not 
challenge the foreign investors’ ownership of assets in Malaya. As emphasized in 
previous research, the first independent government instead decided not to interfere 
with foreign ownership of assets (Lindblad 1998, 106–8; White 1994, 251; 2004, 2).
This non-intervention thus meant continued security for the companies’ own-
ership of assets in Malaya. The figures on the return on investment in late colonial 
and early post-colonial Malaya not only show no major losses on average dur-
ing this period of decolonization, but they record extraordinarily high return on 
investment. While Nicholas White has stressed that British businesses operating 
in Malaya often expressed discontent with both the late colonial and early-inde-
pendent political regimes (White 1994, 1997, 2000, 2004), this does not seem to 
have dissuaded them from holding on to, and profiting enormously from, their 
Malayan investments at this time. Besides the comparatively smooth process of 
decolonization, the high returns in this phase can be explained by looking at the 
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three “pushes” that Chong-Yah Lim identified as important for the development 
of the modern Malayan economy (Lim 1969, 8–18). All these “three pushes” can 
be traced in our data. The years of the Korean War were particularly lucrative for 
the investors, as were the years of the first International Tin Agreement. The port-
folio of investments in rubber ventures did also experience a very high return on 
investment during the post-war period, with the return on investments being par-
ticularly high in the 1950s (Table 2). Rubber ventures appear to have experienced 
similar patterns to that of tin-ventures, with very high total return in particular 
years—for example, during the Korean War—but generally at lower levels than 
tin. The year 1959 seems to have been especially profitable for the investors in 
both rubber and tin, with a total return on investment exceeding 100 per cent in 
both sectors, as shares prices boomed. It does not seem possible to isolate which 
specific factors would have driven the high return this particular year with any 
certainty, as the investors’ expectations in the first years of political independ-
ence (without nationalizations) no doubt interacted with other factors, such as 
the establishment of the International Tin Agreement. It is noteworthy that Brit-
ish investments in other sectors of the Malayan economy continued to have little 
impact upon the portfolio of companies in the sample, as it was the case in previ-
ous decades.
Over the whole period, colonial institutions and global and local political pro-
cesses (e.g. the Japanese occupation, the “Emergency” and later decolonization) 
interacted with global market forces for the output from the Malayan mines and 
plantations. The price of the output remained one of the key factors influencing the 





































































Tin-price in the UK (le-hand axis, constant prices, index 189=100)
Return on investment in n-mining (right hand axis, real return, per cent per year)
Fig. 3  Return on investment and price of output from Malayan tin mining, 1890–1969. Sources: Tin 
prices from Schmitz 1979, table 34.3; data on real return on investments, see Fig. 2
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output and the return on investment in a sector was, however, far from perfect, as 
shown in Figs. 3 and 4.
In both the cases of tin mining and rubber plantations, there seems to exist a rela-
tionship, albeit weak, between the price of the output (tin and rubber, respectively) 
on the international market, and the return on investments in companies involved in 
these sectors. The relationship is seemingly stronger in the case of tin, where both 
series exhibit a positive trend over time, and several of the years of particular peaks 
in the price also correspond to years of higher return on investment in tin mining 
companies. The market for rubber experienced a major boom between 1909 and 
1910, which drove up the international price of rubber to extraordinarily high lev-
els. This peak in the price of rubber is also associated with a very high return on 
investment, particularly in 1909. After a downfall in the 1920s, the price of rubber 
remained comparatively stable. The price movements that occurred did, however, to 
some extent also correlate with the return on investments in Malayan rubber produc-
tion. In neither case is the correlation very strong, but this could be attributable to 
a time-lag, so that the return on investment might have responded to price changes 
over a slightly longer period of time.
Putting our estimates into internationally comparative perspective, the Malayan 
performance was very strong. Investments in Malaya exhibited a premium return 
of 2.7 percentage points per year above what investors could earn from investing 
elsewhere throughout the period under study, and 3.6 percentage points higher than 
what could be earned from investing in African colonies (Table  3). Compared to 
















































































Rubber-price in the UK (le-hand axis, constant prices, index 1906=100)
Return on investment in rubber plantaons (right hand axis, real return, per cent per year)
Fig. 4  Return on investment and price of output from Malayan rubber plantations, 1906–1960. Sources: 
Rubber prices from Lim 1969 appendix table 3.1; but see also Jomo 1986, table 7.1; data on real return 
on investments, see Fig. 2
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ventures performed substantially better from the perspective of the investors over the 
whole period for which data are comparable (Table 3). The high return on invest-
ment can partly be explained in terms of the risk-return relationship. The average 
volatility of the total Malayan portfolio was 35.7 per cent for the entire period. This 
figure is higher than for a portfolio covering the same time and made up of colonial 
investments in Africa (Rönnbäck and Broberg 2019, 127), but lower than it has been 
reported for the Netherlands Indies (Buelens and Frankema 2015, 213). An impor-
tant aspect of the relative high volatility of the Malayan portfolio was that it was so 
heavily dependent on tin and rubber. From an investor point of view, the high return 
was tempting, but the Malayan portfolio alone offered very limited opportunities for 
diversification.
5  Conclusion
A new wave of research on the return on investments across the globe has spurred 
in recent years. One of the aspects studied in this literature is whether the return 
on investments was higher in territories under colonization than it was elsewhere 
in world. Much of the previous research on this topic has focused primarily upon 
investments in Africa. In the present study, we have contributed with new data on 
the return on investments in an Asian colony: British Malaya. In this geographi-
cal context, we study the return on investments for a comparatively large sample 
of companies during the period from 1889 to 1969. We are thereby able to study 
not just the development over the colonial period, but also what happened to the 
return on British investments in Malaya during the early post-colonial period. Our 
results show that the return on investments in Malaya was extremely high, possi-
bly the highest of all economies for which comparable data are available during the 
period under investigation. Our results would thus suggest that British Malaya was 
somewhat of a cash cow for investors at the London Stock Exchange, especially in 
the late colonial and early post-colonial period.
Table 3.  Total return on 
investments in various parts of 
the world, 1890–1969 (per cent 
per year, geometric mean)
Sources “World” portfolio based on Edelstein’s (1970) “overseas” 
portfolio for the decade 1890–1899, and on Dimson et  al. (2002) 
“world” portfolio for the period 1900–1969; African portfolio based 
on Rönnbäck and Broberg (2019); Netherlands Indies portfolio 







Netherlands Indies plantations − 3.6
British Malaya plantations 4.1
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One factor emphasized in previous literature as an explanation of high return 
on investment in colonies is repressive colonial labour institutions. The theo-
retical argument being that by reducing labour costs, company profits could be 
increased. In British Malaya, coercive labour institutions were certainly imposed 
during the colonial period. However, as we have shown in this paper, the histori-
cal timing of when such institutions primarily were employed (during the early 
colonial period) does not match when the return on investments in Malaya was 
high (during the late colonial and early post-colonial period).
One factor of crucial importance for the return on investments in Malaya 
was the nature of the decolonization process. In some colonies, decolonization 
was highly contentious and it led to large-scale nationalizations of foreign-held 
assets. In such cases, the process of decolonization was often associated with 
major financial losses for foreign investors. The process of decolonization was 
certainly not peaceful in British Malaya either, with an armed insurgency tak-
ing place across the late 1940s and early 1950s. British investors might ex ante 
have feared the possible consequences of decolonization either if insurgence 
was to succeed, or if other radical forces took control over Malaya. However, 
the armed insurgency was repressed, and the regime that took power at inde-
pendence abstained from any nationalizations of foreign-owned assets. The pro-
cess of decolonization therefore did not lead to any great losses for the British 
investors in Malaya. Concurrent to decolonization, Malaya’s main outputs, tin 
and rubber, saw their demand skyrocket, as both of these commodities were of 
strategic interest for industrial and military purposes. This eventually played no 
small part in explaining why Malaya turned out to be such a valuable cash cow 
for the British investors.
Appendix
See Table 4.
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Table 4  Annual return on 
investment in Malaya, 1889–
1969 (per cent per year)
Year All sectors (%) Mining (%) Rubber (%) Other (%)
1889 17.1 17.1
1890 − 21.6 − 55.8 − 0.1
1891 − 40.8 − 60.7 − 34.8
1892 − 49.1 − 50.4 − 49.2
1893 − 30.7 0.7 − 36.3
1894 36.6 2.0 46.4
1895 − 20.8 53.0 − 29.7
1896 − 36.4 − 42.4 − 31.3
1897 23.7 23.7
1898 − 13.2 − 13.2
1899 36.5 − 14.9 42.3
1900 − 25.7 − 9.3 − 30.8
1901 − 13.2 − 31.8 − 7.5
1902 16.7 31.0 13.9
1903 − 5.1 − 20.4 − 1.7
1904 35.0 − 37.3 49.7
1905 51.9 − 80.4 64.5
1906 4.5 100.0 5.1 3.1
1907 23.1 24.8 67.1 − 12.3
1908 0.5 − 2.0 − 2.9 8.8
1909 113.8 − 47.2 177.3 67.8
1910 44.1 − 43.3 51.9 11.8
1911 − 5.2 17.7 − 4.6 − 8.6
1912 15.2 64.3 15.2 − 3.6
1913 − 34.7 11.1 − 41.1 − 2.8
1914 − 11.3 − 41.2 − 6.3 − 0.3
1915 43.0 15.5 53.8 − 14.2
1916 − 12.6 23.1 − 16.5 28.6
1917 0.1 26.0 − 1.3 2.9
1918 − 17.5 28.9 − 21.3 8.9
1919 3.5 40.7 3.8 − 20.9
1920 − 66.2 − 39.9 − 67.5 − 63.7
1921 − 9.4 1.4 − 10.7 − 6.3
1922 34.4 25.5 36.2 21.2
1923 12.7 57.2 6.8 22.1
1924 41.1 114.8 36.7 15.7
1925 101.9 48.0 131.5 − 1.9
1926 − 7.8 24.6 − 14.7 19.2
1927 13.5 28.3 10.0 18.3
1928 − 28.6 5.0 − 39.8 18.1
1929 3.3 9.1 0.0 − 0.5
1930 − 21.5 − 6.2 − 30.5 − 26.8
1931 − 11.9 − 4.8 − 17.7 7.4
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Source: see Fig. 2.
Table 4  (continued) Year All sectors (%) Mining (%) Rubber (%) Other (%)
1932 3.3 11.9 − 7.9 234.4
1933 77.8 75.0 86.4 − 4.1
1934 21.5 4.5 32.8 27.2
1935 15.9 58.2 − 0.9 67.7
1936 76.3 113.0 59.3 71.7
1937 − 24.6 − 8.0 − 33.6 − 19.7
1938 − 6.9 − 3.3 − 9.1 − 3.8
1939 21.7 38.2 13.3 15.7
1940 − 14.4 − 3.6 − 22.6 − 10.5
1941 − 44.5 − 51.7 − 41.3 27.7
1942 3.7 22.3 − 10.8 51.1
1943 21.6 38.7 8.1 − 16.2
1944 23.7 7.9 36.0
1945 14.3 34.1 2.0
1946 3.8 11.4 − 2.3
1947 7.3 18.1 − 2.3
1948 − 17.7 − 0.4 − 34.8
1949 22.0 10.0 32.9
1950 37.6 37.3 33.5
1951 74.4 82.8 72.6 4.3
1952 0.6 25.3 − 24.4 − 35.9
1953 23.0 40.3 3.8
1954 61.4 45.2 75.2 2.5
1955 42.9 67.5 28.0
1956 34.5 67.9 7.2
1957 27.8 11.7 43.5
1958 50.1 49.8 47.2
1959 151.1 167.7 140.2
1960 12.3 34.9 − 3.5
1961 27.7 85.0 − 12.1
1962 13.4 14.8 8.3
1963 31.9 52.0 7.4
1964 7.9 9.9 1.5 − 3.0
1965 24.7 36.8 6.6 6.8
1966 22.6 22.8 21.3 17.0
1967 12.7 19.1 − 5.7 28.5
1968 24.8 10.9 47.9 36.0
1969 5.5 12.7 6.9 − 8.6





































































































































Fig. 6  Three-firm concentration ratio of Malayan portfolio of investments, 1889–1969. Sources: see 
Table 1
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